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(101) 
YOU’VE GOT MAIL: FBI HACKING IN UNITED STATES v. LOUGH AND 
WHY IT IS A FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH 
RYAN DIETER* 
“[This] can lead to large-scale privacy and civil liberties abuses at home 
and abroad.”1 
I. PLUGGING IN: REVISITING THE DEBATE BETWEEN SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
The Inland Regional Center is a facility for those with developmental 
disabilities.2  Until December 2, 2015, most people had never heard of the San 
Bernardino facility, but on that date, it became the infamous location of one of 
the most memorable and devastating terrorist attacks on American soil.3  The 
shooters, Syed Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik, killed fourteen people and 
wounded twenty-two others.4  Perhaps even more well-known than the actual 
attack was the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) extremely public battle 
with Apple over access to Farook’s iPhone.5 
After seizing the smartphone, the FBI realized that Farook had secured the 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A. 
2016, The Pennsylvania State University.  This Note is dedicated to my family, friends, and 
all those who have supported me throughout my life.  I would also like to extend a special 
thanks to everyone on the Villanova Law Review for all of their contributions. 
1.  See Ellen Nakashima, This Is How the Government Is Catching People Who Use 
Child Porn Sites, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-the-government-is-using-
malware-to-ensnare-child-porn-users/2016/01/21/fb8ab5f8-bec0-11e5-83d4-
42e3bceea902_story.html?utm_term=.aa634855ec1e [https://perma.cc/HZ8S-7DRY] (quoting 
Ahmed Ghappour, professor at University of California’s Hastings College of the Law). 
2.  See Mark Schone et al., San Bernardino Shooting: What Is the Inland Regional 
Center?, NBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/sToryline/san-bernardino-
shooting/san-bernardino-shooting-what-inland-regional-center-n473016 
[https://perma.cc/TWT8-NHDH] (“The site of a deadly mass shooting in San Bernardino, 
California . . . had just held a holiday party a day before the shots rang out.”). 
3.  See Wm. Robert Johnston, Terrorist Attacks and Related Incidents in the United 
States, JOHNSTON’S ARCHIVE, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255a.html 
[https://perma.cc/CHK2-L8VE] (last visited Mar. 24, 2018) (providing compilation of all 
incidents of terror in the United States since 1865); Everything We Know About the San 
Bernardino Terror Attack Investigation, THE SUN (Nov. 27, 2016, 04:05 PM), 
http://www.sbsun.com/2016/11/27/everything-we-know-about-the-san-bernardino-terror-
attack-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/5PYX-3C94] [hereinafter Everything We Know] (“The 
Dec. 2 shooting at the Inland Regional Center . . . saw a massive response from law 
enforcement agencies from throughout the region, along with the FBI.”). 
4.  See Everything We Know, supra note 3 (“[The shooters] died in a gunfight with law 
enforcement . . . about five hours after the massacre.”).  Farook was a United States citizen, 
but his wife came to the country in 2014.  See id.  The only evidence of their radical views 
was “a Facebook statement in support of terrorist organization Islamic State around the time 
of the shootings.”  See id.  “The couple had drawn a flat line with only a violent spike at the 
end for investigators to pick apart.”  Id.  
5.  See id. (stating FBI seized “pipe bombs, bomb-making materials and thousands of 
rounds of ammunition” during a warranted search of the shooters’ home).  The cellphone was 
found in Farook’s mother’s vehicle.  See id.   
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device using a passcode.6  Consequently, if the agents entered the wrong code 
too many times, the data on the iPhone would be permanently erased.7  Rather 
than press their luck, the FBI agents working the case obtained an order from a 
federal magistrate judge instructing Apple to construct a “backdoor entry” into 
the iPhone via new software.8  Apple’s Chief Executive Officer, Tim Cook, 
referred to the federal order as “chilling,” comparing the potential software to “a 
master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks.”9  The 
technology giant, as well as many other private citizens and commentators, 
worried that if this unprecedented power were given to the FBI, there would be 
nothing to stop it from using the software to access countless other phones.10  
Nevertheless due to third party intervention, the FBI was able to unlock the 
phone before the data was destroyed.11 
Although debate surrounding the above case was fierce, it represented but 
one battle in the struggle between the government’s interest in effective and 
efficient law enforcement and the common interest in privacy.12  Indeed, the 
framers of the United States Constitution anticipated this friction when they 
penned the Fourth Amendment’s protections against governmental intrusions.13  
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is well defined for searches occurring in the 
physical world.14  However, the rules for electronic searches are far less 
 
6.   See id. (explaining that Farook had private passcode for iPhone).  
7.  See id. (“[A]gents were concerned they would permanently lose any data on [the 
phone] if they failed too many times to open it.”).  The phone was issued to Farook by his 
employer, San Bernardino County.  See id.  However, the passcode he used to secure the 
phone had not been shared with county officials.  See id.  With the only person who knew the 
code dead, the FBI could only make guesses at the correct passcode.  See id.  
8.  See id. (“[A] federal magistrate in Riverside [issued] an order in February for Apple 
engineers to develop software for a backdoor entry to the phone.”). 
9.  See Arjun Kharpal, Apple vs FBI: All You Need to Know, CNBC (Mar. 29, 2016, 
06:34 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/29/apple-vs-fbi-all-you-need-to-know.html 
[http://perma.cc/K94G-GY6X] (“Cook’s argument was that if the FBI could access this 
iPhone, nothing would stop them from doing it to many others.”). 
10.  See id. (explaining that data privacy is a sensitive subject after Edward Snowden 
revealed the extent of surveillance conducted by government). 
11.  See id. (explaining FBI has refused to reveal identity of third party or method used 
to unlock phone, but some reported the secret partner was Israeli firm called Cellebrite). 
12.  See id. (“The case marked one of the highest-profile clashes in the debate over 
encryption and data privacy between the government and a technology company.”).  The 
government makes a compelling case that encryption methods used in today’s technology 
makes it harder for it to investigate and solve cases.  See id.  Private companies retorted, 
stating, “encryption is key to protecting user data from hackers.”  See id.   
13.  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . . .”). 
14.  See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (permitting law enforcement 
to search vehicles incident to arrest); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001) (holding 
that police may not use thermal camera to look inside suspect’s home without warrant); 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 565 (1991) (holding that police may search vehicle 
without warrant, so long as they have probable cause to believe evidence of crime will be 
found within); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (holding that there was no violation 
of Fourth Amendment when police looked down into suspect’s fenced-in backyard from 
helicopter); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 35 (1988) (holding that act of combing 
through suspect’s trash on curb is not search under Fourth Amendment); Chimel v. California, 
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2018], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss6/5
2018] YOU’VE GOT MAIL 103	
refined.15 
Compounding this disparity is the fact that the rapid advancement of 
investigative technology has granted the FBI the capability to implant what 
amounts to malware, otherwise known as dangerous software, on a suspect’s 
computer for the purpose of obtaining identifying information about the 
suspect.16  This new tactic, known as a network investigative technique (NIT), 
presented the question at issue in United States v. Lough:17 whether the NIT a 
Fourth Amendment “search.”18  Courts across the country, including Lough, 
have answered this question in the negative simultaneous with the rise in NIT 
has an investigative technique.19  Far fewer cases have found that the NIT is a 
Fourth Amendment search.20  Regardless of the varied dispositions, not a single 
court addressing the issue has completed the search analysis prescribed in the 
Supreme Court’s most important search and seizure case, United States v. 
Jones.21  In Jones, the Court stated that, contrary to previous opinions, whether 
the government had “physically intruded” into the defendant’s privacy is still a 
crucial part of the determination of whether a Fourth Amendment search had 
 
395 U.S. 752, 766–67 (1969) (explaining that police are allowed to conduct limited search 
incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (holding that under certain 
circumstances police may stop and frisk suspect).  
15.  Just three years ago, in a case determining whether police may search the data on a 
cell phone, the Supreme Court recognized a difference between a cell phone and a cigarette 
carton as a container of information.  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2478–79 (2014) 
(holding that although cellphones and cigarette cartons can both feasibly hold information, the 
volume of data a cellphone is capable of storing distinguishes it from all other containers). 
16.  See United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770 (N.D. W. Va. 2016) (presenting 
issue of FBI utilizing malware to force suspect’s computer to send suspect’s IP address and 
other information to law enforcement agents). 
17.  221 F. Supp. 3d 770 (N.D. W. Va. 2016). 
18.  See id. at 774–75 (stating that initial question in deciding whether to suppress 
evidence is whether a Fourth Amendment search was conducted). 
19.  See id. at 775–76 (holding that because defendant had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information taken by malware, NIT was not a search); see also United States v. 
Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 933 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (“[T]he FBI in the instant case was under no 
legal obligation to obtain a search warrant . . . as IP addresses are unlikely to be entitled to the 
same Fourth Amendment protections as are the substantive contents of users’ computers.”); 
United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC2016, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (proclaiming that NIT was not search); United States v. Eure, No. 
2:16cr43, 2016 WL 4059663, at *9 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016) (holding that “searches and 
seizures perform[ed] pursuant to the NIT did not violate Fourth Amendment”); United States 
v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 444 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (holding that defendant’s computer was 
not searched because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their IP 
address). 
20.  See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 (E.D. Va. 2016) (finding that 
because government “invaded the contents of the computer” NIT constituted Fourth 
Amendment search); see also United States v. Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d 732, 739 (W.D. Ky. 
2016) (citing United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
because defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in a computer, rather than a IP 
address, government’s intrusion was a search)); United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-
DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016) (holding that installation of code 
without permission is search). 
21.  565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012) (stating that test for whether search has occurred does not 
end with “reasonable expectation of privacy” examination, but also must include “physical 
intrusion” test). 
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occurred.22 
This Note argues that because the Lough court and its many companions 
overlooked the Jones case, they erred in concluding the NIT was not a Fourth 
Amendment search.23  First, this Note will provide a brief overview of the 
technological aspects that seem to confuse courts.24  Second, this Note will 
examine the history of Fourth Amendment searches.25  Then, this Note will 
summarize the common nucleus of facts that led to Lough and describe the 
court’s reasoning for its conclusion.26  Finally, this Note will demonstrate that 
under a complete Fourth Amendment analysis, the FBI’s use of the NIT 
constituted a search.27 
II. READING THE INSTRUCTIONS: COMPUTER SCIENCE 101 AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES 
In her concurrence in Jones, Justice Sotomayor suggested that current law 
regarding searches may not be able to keep pace with the rate of technological 
advancement.28  She noted further that expectations of privacy deemed 
“reasonable” by society may change with the amount of information publicly 
available about a person via the Internet.29  Indeed, confusion amongst judges 
regarding how technology works has led to some incongruous analogies 
attempting to reconcile the physical world with the digital world.30 
A. Welcome to Class: A Brief Overview of Computer Science Concepts 
Cases like Lough require a great deal of technical literacy to understand the 
 
22.  See id. (stating that “reasonable expectation of privacy” determination 
supplemented rather than replaced the “physical intrusion” inquiry). 
23.  See infra notes 146-87 and accompanying text for critical analysis of Lough 
decision. 
24.  See infra notes 29–59 and accompanying text for background information on 
relevant computer science concepts. 
25.  See infra notes 60–105 and accompanying text for overview on the history of 
Fourth Amendment searches. 
26.  See infra notes 106–25 and accompanying text for information about the facts of 
Lough. 
27.  See infra notes 146–87 and accompanying text for critical analysis of Lough 
decision. 
28.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”). 
29.  See id. at 418 (“I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the 
warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the 
last week, or month, or year.  But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain 
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat 
secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.”). 
30.  See id. at 420 (Alito, J., dissenting) (comparing GPS tracker to law enforcement 
agent hiding somewhere inside vehicle to track its movements); see also United States v. 
Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 777 (N.D. W. Va. 2016) (citing United States v. Jean, 207 F. 
Supp. 3d 920, 938 (W.D. Ark. 2016)) (agreeing with courts that have likening method 
computers use to connect to various websites to act of traveling via car to location of server 
housing site). 
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issue, and some courts have proven better than others at describing the 
technology involved.31  One key technological term to understand before diving 
into Lough is Internet Protocol Address (IP address).32  An IP address is an 
identification number that allows devices to connect to the Internet.33  A house, 
business, or other physical property has a street address; similarly, each device 
capable of accessing the Internet has its own specific IP address.34  A post office 
cannot deliver mail if the exact receiving address is not provided.35  Similarly, 
in the digital world, data cannot be transmitted over the Internet without 
knowing which IP address to send the information to.36 
The average Internet user connects to the Internet via an internet service 
provider (ISP), which then assigns the user an IP address.37  Along with the ISP, 
website administrators can view the IP addresses of all individuals who visit 
their sites, however, only the ISP can link the IP address to a person’s true 
identity.38  At least one court has looked into the privacy rights individuals have 
in their IP addresses.39  For instance, even in a case where the FBI had 
administrative control of a website and could see the IP addresses visiting a 
child pornography website, it was only able to obtain the suspects’ names by 
going to the ISP.40 
In child pornography cases it is common for users of illicit sites to hide 
their IP addresses from child pornography websites using software called The 
 
31.   See Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 924–27 (explaining, in great detail, technology used 
to hide child pornography websites on Internet and FBI’s NIT process). 
32.  See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 775 (determining that individual does not have 
reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address because it has been shared with a third 
party). 
33.  See Tim Fisher, What Is an IP Address, LIFEWIRE (Jun. 1, 2017), 
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-an-ip-address-2625920 [https://perma.cc/MSA4-ZR8C] 
(“Having an IP address allows a device to communicate with other devices over an IP-based 
network like the internet.”). 
34.  See id. (“[D]evices on a network are differentiated from one another through IP 
addresses.”). 
35.  See id. (“It’s not enough to just put a package with [the recipient’s] name on it 
through the mail and expect it to reach him.”). 
36.  See id. (“[I]nstead of using a phone book to look up someone’s name to find their 
physical address, your computer uses DNS servers to look up a hostname to find its IP 
address.”).  A Domain Name System (DNS) server is a database of IP addresses and their 
common names (i.e. “google.com”).  See Tim Fisher, What Is a DNS Server?, Lifewire (Jan. 
16, 2018), https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-a-dns-server-2625854 [https://perma.cc/ZPF2-
FJHX] (explaining DNS servers and their relation to IP addresses).   
37.  See United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 563 (3d. Cir. 2010) (explaining process 
of customers connecting to the internet).  ISPs only keep information on customers’ assigned 
IP address for a short window of time because many ISPs change their customers’ IP 
addresses over time.  See id. (“Depending on the ISP, a customer’s IP address can change 
each time he logs on to the internet.”). 
38.  See id. (“IP addresses are also conveyed to websites that an internet user visits . . . .  
However, site administrators do not possess information linking a given IP address to a 
particular person.”). 
39.  See id. at 573 (considering whether defendant had reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his IP addresses). 
40.  See id. (explaining that FBI was only able to learn defendant’s legal name by 
gaining administrative access to site, monitoring IP addresses, and asking ISP to match IP 
addresses with associated users). 
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Onion Router (Tor).41  Tor’s name is a nod to the way in which it cloaks users’ 
IP addresses; it “bounces” a user through a network of other Tor users in order 
to create “layers” of protection.42  The protection takes away a website’s ability 
to read a user’s IP address, only revealing that someone is using Tor to visit the 
website.43  Each layer in the chain only knows the prior IP address and the next 
layer to send it to.44  As a result, no single layer knows both the real IP address 
and the target webpage.45 
Although Tor is commonly used for nefarious purposes, it originated as a 
way for the United States military to mask its confidential communications.46  
For Tor to be effective, these confidential communications needed to be hidden 
amongst other, non-military users.47  This is why Tor is free to download for 
anyone who wishes to utilize it.48  Because of its open availability, many use 
Tor for truly innocent and even humanitarian purposes.49  Nevertheless, it is 
also an attractive piece of software for criminals who have created a “Dark 
Web” filled with child pornography websites and illicit drug markets.50 
 
41.  See United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 772 (N.D. W. Va. 2016) (stating 
that Tor allows criminals to interact with child pornography websites without detection by law 
enforcement by “hiding their IP addresses and identities”); see generally, Abbott, Hiding from 
Prying Eyes, OR. ST. B. BULL. 32 (2008)(concluding that resources like Tor can be used for 
criminal purposes and “heroic” purposes). 
42.  See NPR Staff, Going Dark: The Internet Behind the Internet, NPR: ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED (May 25, 2014, 06:54 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/05/25/315821415/going-dark-the-
internet-behind-the-internet [https://perma.cc/TF9J-24YC] (“[T]he onion refers to the layers 
you go through to disguise your identity.”).   
43.  See id. (explaining that when using Tor, the location given to website will change 
to a different node in the Tor network).  For instance, a user in Washington, D.C. could send 
internet traffic across the globe and “the website that [a user visits] will see that someone in 
Russia is visiting, not [the user] in D.C.”  See id.  
44. See Tor: Overview, THE TOR PROJECT, 
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en [https://perma.cc/AWM7-HFY5] (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2017) (“No individual relay ever knows the complete path that a data packet 
has taken.”). 
45.  See Tor: Overview, supra note 44 (“Because each relay sees no more than one hop 
in the circuit, neither an eavesdropper nor a compromised relay can . . . link the connection’s 
source and destination.”).  Tor keeps a given circuit open for only ten minutes, then a new 
circuit is created to ensure anonymity.  See id.  Tor’s process has been likened to a skilled 
getaway driver escaping a “tail” by police.  See id. 
46.  See NPR Staff, supra note 42 (stating that Tor was developed at Naval Research 
Laboratory). 
47.  See id. (“[B]y opening up this system to everyone, different groups of people can 
hide in a big crowd of anonymous Tor users.”).  
48.  See United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 924 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (describing 
Tor as free software used to hide IP addresses from detection); Tor: Overview, supra note 44 
(explaining that the more users Tor has, the more hidden each user can be). 
49.  See NPR Staff, supra note 42 (explaining that Tor is used by “human rights 
activists, journalists, military, law enforcement,” political dissidents, and “normal people”).  
Indeed, due to its unique security, Tor saw a dramatic increase in its usage during the Arab 
Spring.  See id.  Additionally, because of its message of protecting civil liberties, Tor saw an 
increase after Edward Snowden’s whistleblowing about the extent of the National Security 
Agency’s (NSA) surveillance program.  See id.  
50.  See Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 925 (explaining that child pornography websites are 
frequently found in Tor’s “hidden services” as its users feel anonymous). 
6
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To combat Tor’s masking of IP addresses, the FBI “ran an end-around” and 
created a piece of software that would force a suspect’s computer to reveal its 
IP address.51  To combat Tor’s masking of IP addresses, the FBI “ran an end-
around” and created the NIT software, which is essentially malware, to force a 
suspect’s computer to reveal its IP address.52  Malware is an abbreviation for 
“malicious software” and is considered to be “any program or file that is 
harmful to a computer user.”53  These programs can be designed or coded to do 
anything from steal sensitive data to completely change the core functions of a 
computer.54  Frequently, malware is designed to download to users’ computers, 
without their knowledge or permission, after they have visited a malware-
infected site.55  Because of the negative connotation associated with the term 
malware, the FBI objected to the labeling of the NIT as such.56  However, the 
term is the most apt description of the software used in Lough.57 
B. Search History: The Evolution of Fourth Amendment Search Analysis 
The United States Supreme Court has issued numerous opinions defining a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment.58  Perhaps no case has played a greater 
role in shaping this definition than Katz v. United States.59  In Katz, the Court 
detailed a two-part reasonable expectation test for determining whether an 
 
51.  See United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 773 (2016) (N.D. W. Va. 2016) 
(explaining that NIT software triggered suspect’s computer to reveal IP address and other 
identifying information to FBI). 
52.  See Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 927–28 (“The FBI was able to cause the user’s 
computer to report the identifying information by exploiting a defective window in the TOR 
browser [sic], through which it ran what amounts to malware on the user’s computer, with the 
objective being to override the TOR browser’s and the user’s computer security settings, and 
then ‘cause’ the user’s computer to return discrete, content-neutral items of identifying 
information back to the FBI.”). 
53.  See Margaret Rouse, Malware (Malicious Software), TECHTARGET, 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/malware [https://perma.cc/EP63-B6G8] (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2018) (providing basic definition of malware). 
54.  See id. (“These malicious programs can perform a variety of functions, including 
stealing, encrypting or deleting sensitive data, altering or hijacking core computing functions 
and monitoring users’ computer activity without their permission.”).  Examples of malware 
include viruses, Trojan horses, spyware, and Ransomware.  See id.   
55.  See id. (describing the different methods of spreading malware; the method 
described here is called “drive-by download”).   
56.  See Jean, 207 F.Supp.3d at 927 n.7 (“Agent Aflin objects to describing the NIT as 
malware, because the term has a derogatory connotation.”). 
57.  See Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 927 n.7 (“[W]hen used as a term of art to explain an 
ethical hacking technique used by law enforcement, the term malware is descriptive of the 
NIT used here.”); see also United States v. Lough, 221 F.Supp.3d 770, 772-74 (describing the 
NIT used by the FBI). 
58.  See supra note 13 and accompanying text for examples of Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
59.  389 U.S. 347 (1967); see Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking out of Fourth Amendment 
Dead Ends: United States v. Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1, 17 (2012) 
(stating that Jones is potentially the most important Fourth Amendment opinion since Katz, 
thereby recognizing Katz as most important Fourth Amendment case in forty years prior to 
Jones). 
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activity constituted a Fourth Amendment search.60  Nevertheless, after decades 
of application, the Court reconsidered its early jurisprudence and modified the 
search analysis to include not only the Katz test, but also a test based on a 
physical intrusion by law enforcement.61 
1. The “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test 
Prior to Katz, the governing rule regarding the Fourth Amendment stated 
that a search occurred only when a government agent physically intruded into a 
“constitutionally protected area.”62  The Court had made clear that “[w]hat a 
person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not subject to Fourth Amendment 
protection.”63  This became an issue in Katz, where the FBI had been 
investigating the defendant for his participation in a gambling ring.64  The FBI 
affixed a listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth to 
eavesdrop on the defendant’s conversation.65  Because the device never actually 
went inside the booth, the FBI’s activity would not have constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search under the physical intrusion analysis.66 
In shaping a new rule, the Court concluded in Katz that it did not matter 
where a search took place, but only whether a person expected that his or her 
information would not be made public.67  Defined more clearly in Justice 
 
60.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353–59 (holding that the “trespass” doctrine for Fourth 
Amendment searches is no longer controlling and creating instead a test based on expectation 
of privacy). 
61.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“Fourth Amendment rights 
do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”).  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated 
that the Katz test did not supplant the physical intrusion test, but merely supplemented it.  See 
id. at 406–07. 
62.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (stating that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places”).  The parties in Katz spent a large amount of their briefs debating whether a phone 
booth was a “constitutionally protected area.”  See id.  Rather than examining where a 
particular search took place, the Court decided that when considering whether a search had 
occurred, the important factor to consider is whether an individual intended to expose that 
information to the public.  See id.  
63.  See id. (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); United States v. 
Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)). 
64.  See id. at 348 (explaining that Katz was under investigation for “transmitting 
wagering information” using a public telephone booth). 
65.  See id. at 348 (explaining that device was used to listen to and record numerous 
calls by the defendant in order to obtain evidence of his criminal activity).  The defendant 
used the phone to “transmit[] wagering information”; which meant he was caught illegally 
gambling using the phone booth.  See id.  Technically, the defendant’s actions exposed him to 
the public.  See id.  Not only was the defendant using a public phone booth, but the booth was 
partially made of glass, therefore anyone walking past would see he made calls inside.  See id. 
at 351.  However, the Court stated that although he could be seen publicly, that when the door 
of the booth shut, it signaled the defendant’s expectation that the conversation he had on the 
phone was meant to be private.  See id. at 352–53. 
66.  See id. at 353 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible 
items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements overheard without any ‘technical 
trespass under . . . local property law.’” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 
511 (1961))).  “[T]he surveillance technique . . . employed involved no physical penetration of 
the telephone booth from which petitioner placed his calls.”  Id. at 352. 
67.  See id. at 352 (“One who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind him, and 
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Harlan’s concurrence, this new test featured two prongs.68  The first prong of 
the test considers whether an individual had a subjective expectation of 
privacy.69  The second prong of the test, the objective prong, asks whether this 
subjective expectation was one that society is willing to accept.70  Therefore, an 
individual with a reasonable expectation of privacy cannot be subject to a 
warrantless or unreasonable search absent exigent circumstances.71 
As the Katz test has been developed and applied over time, the Court has 
identified certain types of information that lack any reasonable expectation of 
privacy.72  One such circumstance is the “third party doctrine.”73  Under this 
rule, any information conveyed to or shared with a third party loses any 
expectation of privacy it once had.74 
Of particular importance to this area is the way in which the third party 
doctrine interacts with IP addresses.75  Because an IP address is given to a user 
by an ISP, that information is, by necessity, shared with a third party.76  Under 
 
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he 
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.  To read the Constitution more 
narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private 
communication.”). 
68.  See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has 
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement.”). 
69.  See id. (stating that first a person must “have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy”). 
70.  See id. (“[S]econd . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
71.  See id. at 357 (stating that searches conducted without a warrant are per se 
unreasonable “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”). 
72.  See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573–74 (citing “third party 
doctrine” and applying it to IP addresses); see, e.g., Note, Everybody’s Going Surfing: The 
Third Circuit Approves the Warrantless Use of Internet Tracking Devices in United States v. 
Stanley, 56 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 1, 5 (explaining that third party doctrine applies to 
dialed phone numbers, as customers voluntarily transmit that information to phone 
companies). 
73.  See id. at 574 (explaining “third party doctrine”); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (“[The Supreme Court] consistently has held that a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”). 
74.  See Christie, 624 F.3d at 573–74 (explaining that once information is “voluntarily 
conveyed” to a third party, a person “assume[s] the risk” that information will be provided to 
police); see also United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[B]y ‘revealing 
his affairs to another,’ an individual ‘takes the risk . . . that the information will be conveyed 
by that person to the Government.’” (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 
(1976))). 
75.  See Christie, 624 F.3d at 573–74 (discussing application of Katz reasonable 
expectation test to IP addresses).  In Christie, the FBI obtained administrative control of a 
third party website offering illegal and obscene content.  See id. at 563.  Unlike in Lough, the 
site was not hidden with Tor, therefore the FBI simply took the list of IP addresses that had 
visited the site to the ISP and it matched the addresses with true identities.  See id.  See also, 
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding third party doctrine 
applies and there is no expectation of privacy in IP address). 
76.  See Christie, 624 F.3d at 563 (explaining the process of assigning an IP address).  
IP addresses are assigned by an ISP every time the user connects to the internet.  See id.  
“Depending on the ISP, a customer’s IP address can change each time he logs on to the 
internet.”  Id.  Website administrators also have access to a list of IP addresses that have 
visited their site, however they do not have access to the real names of the customers 
possessing each IP address.  See id. 
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current law, an Internet user cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
an IP address because government agents can easily obtain that information 
from the ISP.77 
2. The “Common-law Trespassory” Test 
After over forty years of applying the Katz test, the Court shifted its 
viewpoint again in Jones, where it seemingly resurrected the idea that a Fourth 
Amendment search can also be tied to a “physical intrusion.”78  In Jones, the 
FBI attached a GPS device to a suspect’s car and used it to track his 
movements.79  The Court simplified the events of the case when it stated “[t]he 
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining 
information,” and that it had “no doubt that such a physical intrusion would 
have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
when it was adopted.”80  Although the Court agreed that citizens have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their public locations, it reasoned that “the 
officers in this case did more than conduct a visual inspection of the defendant’s 
vehicle.”81  By reviving the physical intrusion concept, the Court made clear 
that a full analysis for a Fourth Amendment search entails both the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test and the physical intrusion test.82 
 
77.  See id. at 574 (“[N]o reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an IP address, 
because that information is also conveyed to and, indeed, from third parties, including ISPs.”); 
see also United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that subscribers 
do not have subjective expectation of privacy in information conveyed to service providers 
because they “assumed the risk” that information could be handed over to police); United 
States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that information given to 
an ISP is not protected by Fourth Amendment).  
78.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 (2012) (explaining that “Katz did not 
narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope,” but merely supplemented original physical intrusion 
test). 
79.  See id. at 402–03 (explaining facts of the FBI investigation).  From its position on 
“the undercarriage” of the vehicle, the device could establish “the vehicle’s location within 50 
to 100 feet.”  See id. at 403.  It “communicated that location by cellular phone to a 
Government computer.”  Id.  The FBI secured a warrant authorizing it to attach the device 
anywhere in the District of Columbia within ten days of securing the warrant.  See id. at 402–
03.  However, the FBI attached the GPS on the eleventh day in the state of Maryland, 
violating the precise authorization of the warrant.  See id. at 403.  The district court “held the 
data admissible, because ‘[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.’”  See id. at 
403 (quoting United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006)). 
80.  See id. at 404–05 (explaining its holding that Katz test is mere supplement to 
original “common-law trespassory test”); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 111 
(1986) (finding that even intrusion as slight as an officer reaching his arm into a vehicle is 
enough to constitute physical intrusion for Fourth Amendment purposes); see also, Thomas, 
Stumbling Toward History: The Framers’ Search and Seizure World, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
199, 206-215 (2010) (describing the colonial history that influenced the Framers’ 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment). 
81.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 410 (citation omitted) (distinguishing facts underlying Jones 
from those in Class).   
82.  See id. at 411 (making clear that full analysis is a combination of two tests rather 
than excluding one in favor of another).  Justice Scalia, in response to criticism from the 
concurrence wrote that unlike those in favor of using only the Katz analysis, “we do not make 
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One obstacle facing the Supreme Court in reaching its conclusion in Jones 
was a pair of cases dealing with the use of “beepers” to track drug-making 
chemicals.83  In United States v. Knotts,84 the first of the two cases, law 
enforcement officials placed a beeper inside a drum containing a chemical 
precursor used to make illegal drugs.85  The Court ruled that there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in public movements, so the fact that the 
beeper was placed in the drum without the purchaser’s permission and used to 
follow the suspect’s movements played no role in the analysis.86 
In the second case, United States v. Karo,87 the Court stated that until the 
beeper was used to monitor the suspect’s location, there was no infringement of 
a privacy interest.88  In a nearly identical set of facts to Knotts, the law 
enforcement officers in Karo placed a beeper into a drum used to store 
chemicals before it was sold to a suspected drug manufacturer.89  While 
acknowledging that the installation of the beeper was a trespass, the Court in 
Karo ultimately held that it did not violate the Fourth Amendment.90 
In the Jones opinion, Justice Scalia distinguished the installation of the 
devices in Knotts and Karo from the installation of the GPS tracker on the 
defendant’s Jeep.91  The notable difference in Jones was the fact that “the 
Government trespassorily inserted the information-gathering device,” because 
 
trespass the exclusive test.”  See id. 
83.  See id. at 409–10 (distinguishing ruling from those of Knotts and Karo). 
84.  460 U.S. 276 (1983).  
85.  See id. at 277 (explaining that officers placed “beeper,” or radio transmitter, inside 
of “five gallon drum containing chloroform purchased by” suspected drug manufacturer prior 
to delivery of the chemicals).  Officers installed the beeper while the container was in the 
possession of the Hawkins Chemical Company.  See id. at 278.  The arrangement was such 
that when the defendant placed the next order, the company would make sure his product was 
placed in the drum containing the beeper.  See id.  Authorities used both the beeper as well as 
visual surveillance to track the container to a cabin.  See id. at 278–79. 
86.  See id. at 281 (comparing privacy in location to the “diminished” privacy in a 
vehicle).  “A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”  Id.  The Court also 
noted that it had “never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality.”  See id. at 284.  
Essentially, the Court ruled that the beeper was just an extension of what was visible to the 
public; anyone watching the movements of the vehicle carrying the drum would have known 
the container was in the cabin.  See id. at 285. 
87.  468 U.S. 705 (1984).  
88.  See id. at 712 (“The mere transfer to Karo of a can containing an unmonitored 
beeper infringed no privacy interest.  [The beeper] conveyed no information that Karo wished 
to keep private, for it conveyed no information at all.”). 
89.  See id. at 708 (explaining that with consent from the chemical supplier, officers 
replaced can of ether, intended for delivery to defendant, with container of their own holding a 
beeper).  Much like in Knotts, the government used the beeper to track the movements of the 
can and eventually led to subsequent searches and arrests.  See id. at 708–10. 
90.  See id. at 712–13 (“At most, there was a technical trespass on the space occupied 
by the beeper.  The existence of a physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question 
of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated . . . .”).  The Karo court established that 
the mere act of transferring to Karo a container with a beeper was not a Fourth Amendment 
search.  See id. at 712.  It was not until the authorities began monitoring the beeper that a 
potential for a violation was possible.  See id.  
91.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408–10 (2012) (summarizing holdings in 
Knotts and Karo). 
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the vehicle was in the defendant’s possession at the time of the installation.92  In 
Knotts and Karo, however, the installation occurred before the containers were 
in the defendant’s possession.93  Therefore, the seemingly inconsistent 
conclusions between Jones and the two prior cases are reconcilable under the 
physical intrusion test.94 
C. Get off my Cyberlawn: Is Cybertrespass a Thing? 
An emerging issue that plays a substantially important role in the 
discussion of the NIT as a Fourth Amendment search is whether someone can 
trespass in cyberspace, and many courts have held the digital transmission of 
unwanted signals is enough to establish a trespass.95  Nevertheless, one 
commenter finds it troubling for courts to be establishing the tort of 
cybertrespass, worrying that it will stunt the free growth of the Internet.96  Yet, 
another legal commenter argues that advances in cybertrespass law are 
beneficial because advancements allow companies to protect their investments 
in web-resources.97 
Although Congress has not created a statute specifically defining the crime 
of cybertrespass, it has criminalized the act of interfering with “protected 
 
92.  See id. (explaining that the difference lies in the time period of installation of 
tracking devices). 
93.  See id. at 409 (explaining that in both cases a device was placed into container 
while it was still in possession of the respective chemical distributor). 
94.  See id. at 410 (holding that because the Jeep was in defendant’s possession at the 
time the GPS was attached, FBI had physically intruded into his property).  Whereas in Knotts 
and Karo, the government could not have intruded into defendants’ property as drums were 
not in possession of defendants when devices were attached.  See id.  
95.  See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 
2000) (holding that electronic signals are tangible enough to establish trespass action); 
America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550–51 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that even 
without physical damage to the computer, unwanted spam was still a trespass); CompuServe 
Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (recognizing a 
viable claim for trespass where defendant sent unwanted electronic signals to plaintiff’s 
network); Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566 (1996) (holding that it is 
a trespass to “hack” into a computer system to make free long distance telephone calls); 
Washington v. Riley, 846 P.2d 1365, 1373 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (“[A] person is guilty of 
computer trespass in the first degree if the person, without authorization, intentionally gains 
access to a computer system or electronic data base of another.” (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 
9A.52.110 (repealed 2016))). 
96.  See Edward W. Chang, Bidding on Trespass: eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. and 
the Abuse of Trespass Theory in Cyberspace-Law, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 446 (2001) (arguing 
that unbridled expansion of cybertrespass law is dangerous).  Chang was particularly 
concerned with the idea that in eBay, the court allowed for minimal damage or use to be 
sufficient to support an action for trespass.  See id. at 462–64; see also eBay, Inc., 100 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1071 (holding that even though the defendant used a very small percentage of 
plaintiff’s resources, it still committed actionable trespass). 
97.  See generally Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2003) 
(advocating for an even more liberal set of cybertrespass laws).  Epstein states that he believes 
cybertrespass should develop to mirror the law of real property.  See id. at 82–83.  His 
reasoning is that cyber entities are “fixed” in their cyber locations just as real property is fixed 
to its position on land.  See id. at 83.  This would mean that plaintiffs would not be required to 
show any real damage at all in order to state a sufficient cybertrespass claim.  See id. at 78. 
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computers” through the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).98  Under the 
CFAA, it is illegal to access a computer for the purpose of obtaining 
information without permission.99  While the CFAA has been criticized for 
being overly broad, it sends a signal to courts that Congress considers 
unauthorized computer access to be a serious offense.100 
III. DOWNLOAD COMPLETE: THE FBI’S PLAYPEN STING 
The Lough case, and its many companions, stem from a common nucleus 
of facts surrounding an FBI sting of a child pornography website.101  In 
December 2014, the FBI learned that a child pornography website was 
operating on the Tor network under the name “Playpen.”102  Due to the masking 
process of the Tor software, the FBI struggled to locate the server running the 
website.103  However, on February 20, 2015, the FBI was able to seize the 
server hosting Playpen from a web-hosting facility in North Carolina.104  Rather 
than disabling Playpen and permanently removing it from the Dark Web, the 
FBI continued operating the website for thirteen days.105 
The seizure of Playpen and the arrest of its owner allowed the FBI to 
assume administrative control over the website.106  Even though FBI agents 
 
98.  18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012) (criminalizing certain uses of computers by government 
and in interstate commerce). 
99.  See id. § 1030(a)(2)(c) (“[It is a crime to] intentionally access a computer without 
authorization or [when authorization is exceeded], and thereby obtain[] . . . information from 
any protected computer”). 
100.  See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1568 (2010) (examining the criticisms of the definition of “protected 
computer”).  Under the act any computer in interstate commerce is “protected” and in reality 
every computer is engaged in interstate commerce.  See id.  
101.  See United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 772 (N.D. W. Va. 2016) 
(explaining that Playpen was used as a means for unsavory individuals to look at, share, and 
download child pornography). 
102.  See id. (explaining that Playpen was operated in secrecy of the Tor network where 
users could hide from law enforcement by masking their true identities and IP addresses).  In 
order to access Playpen, users needed to sign in using a username and password.  See id. at 
773.  The site had approximately 215,000 members, of which the NIT was deployed against 
1,300.  See Nakashima, supra note 1 (discussing Playpen sting and government’s use of 
malware to identify child pornography offenders).  
103.  See United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 925–26 (W.D. Ark. 2016) 
(explaining that, due to complete anonymity of Tor network, there was no way for the FBI to 
identify or locate site’s operator). 
104.  See id. at 925 (“[T]he FBI received a serendipitous break [in its search for the 
Playpen owner].”).  While the site was going through an update, the owner of the site 
mistakenly deactivated the Tor cloaking settings.  See id.  This left the Playpen site exposed 
for “a few days.”  See id.  The deactivated settings opened a window wide enough for the FBI 
to find the server that was hosting Playpen.  See id.  After seizing the server, the FBI arrested 
the site’s owner on February 19, 2015.  See id.  
105.  See id. at 926; see also Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (explaining that FBI 
continued to administer site in order to identify users who were involved with abuse of 
children).  Playpen was kept open from February 20, 2015 until March 4, 2015.  See Jean, 207 
F. Supp. 3d at 926.  To accomplish this task, “agents made a copy of the Playpen website,” 
placed it on a government server, and assumed administrative control over it.  See id.  
106.  See Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 925–26 (restating the process by which FBI gained 
control of Playpen). 
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working the case became the administrators of the website, due to the Tor 
network they had no way of identifying visitors.107  In order to solve the 
dilemma, the FBI created a piece of software, the NIT, and obtained a federal 
warrant to deploy it.108 
The NIT was deployed when a website visitor “clicked on a forum link to 
begin downloading child pornography.”109  The NIT would then “surreptitiously 
deploy” and force the “activating computer” to send certain identifying 
information to the FBI.110  In addition to the computer’s IP address, the NIT 
relayed to the FBI the type of operating system used by the computer, the 
computer’s “Host Name,” and the computer’s media access control (MAC) 
address.111 
The defendant in Lough was one of many to have accessed Playpen while it 
was under the FBI’s control.112  His IP address was revealed when the FBI 
deployed the NIT against his computer.113  To obtain the defendant’s actual 
identification, the FBI subpoenaed his ISP.114  Using the information from the 
NIT and the ISP, the FBI obtained a search warrant authorizing agents to search 
 
107.  See id. at 926 (“The users’ identifying information was purposely unknown to 
Playpen’s owner, and the users’ IP addresses remained concealed because the website was 
only accessible as a hidden service on the TOR network, thus providing total anonymity to the 
users.”). 
108.  See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 772–73 (describing the process used by the FBI to 
obtain a NIT warrant).  For the purposes of this Note, the fact that the FBI actually obtained a 
warrant makes no difference; the Lough court concluded that one was not needed because the 
NIT was not a Fourth Amendment search.  See id. at 775–76.  The judge that issued the 
warrant was a federal magistrate judge from the Eastern District of Virginia.  See id. at 776; 
Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 926.  Much of the controversy regarding the warrant stems from the 
fact that it applied to “searches” across the country and outside the jurisdiction of the 
magistrate judge.  See Nakashima, supra note 1.  An attorney representing a defendant similar 
to Lough, stated, “There has never been any warrant . . . that allows searches on that scale.  It 
is unprecedented.”  See id.  
109.  See Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 927 (explaining that to deploy the NIT numerous 
affirmative actions were necessary, including logging into the Playpen website using a 
username and password and clicking on forum to begin download).  The NIT and the illegal 
content would download simultaneously.  See id. at 928.  
110.  See id. at 928 (explaining that entire process of transmitting information occurred 
before child pornography had even completed its download).  The NIT worked “by exploiting 
a defective window in the TOR browser, through which it ran what amounts to malware on 
the user’s computer.”  Id. at 927 (footnote omitted).  This process is what forced the computer 
to return information to the FBI.  See id. at 928. 
111.  See id. at 926 (stating that although this information allowed the FBI to obtain 
identifying information about suspect’s computer, they were not given any information about 
the suspects “true identity” in physical world).  For efficiency purposes the NIT also 
generated a “unique identifier” each time it was deployed and kept track of whether or not the 
NIT had been previously deployed on the particular “activating computer.”  See id. 
112.  See Nakashima, supra note 1 (stating that over 130 persons have been charged in 
relation to Playpen sting). 
113.  See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (“Utilizing the NIT, the FBI determined that a 
user living in Fairmont, West Virginia, with the username ‘2tots,’ had logged into the Playpen 
website and accessed child pornography.”). 
114.  See id. (“An administrative subpoena served on Frontier Communications 
Corporation [the ISP] established that the IP address for ‘2tots’ belonged to Lough’s account, 
which was registered to a street address later determined to belong to him.”). 
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the defendant’s home.115  On March 23, 2016, the defendant pled guilty to child 
pornography charges but later moved to withdraw the plea.116  In September 
2016, the defendant moved to suppress all evidence that resulted from the NIT 
warrant.117  After carefully considering the arguments presented by the parties, 
the court concluded that a discussion of the warrant was not necessary to the 
court’s determination because the NIT did not constitute a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.118 
IV. NO HIDING BEHIND A KEYBOARD: THE LOUGH COURT CONCLUDES IP 
ADDRESS IS PUBLIC INFORMATION 
To determine whether the evidence stemming from the NIT should be 
suppressed, the Lough court first had to determine whether the NIT constituted 
a search under the Fourth Amendment.119  In analyzing this question, the court 
 
115.  See id. (stating that the FBI secured a warrant to raid the suspect’s home and that 
after the raid, agents seized “multiple pieces of evidence suspected of containing child 
pornography”). 
116.  See id. (recounting that Lough waived his right of indictment, “acknowledged the 
facts” presented by the FBI agent, and admitted to charges).  On May 4, 2016, Lough moved 
to withdraw the plea after learning of another court that had suppressed evidence stemming 
from the NIT.  See id.  
117.  See id. (explaining rationale for Lough’s motion).  Lough argued that the evidence 
must be excluded because the warrant was invalid.  See id.  The government argued that the 
warrant was valid as the NIT acted as a tracking device.  See id.  Magistrate judges are 
allowed to authorize the installation of a tracking device in their own district, even if the 
subject then leaves the district of installation.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4) (“[A] magistrate 
judge . . . has authority to issue a warrant to install within the district a tracking device; the 
warrant may authorize use of the device to track the movement of a person or property located 
within the district, outside the district, or both[.]”).  Many courts, including Lough and some 
of its companions, have concluded that Rule 41(b)(4) gave the magistrate judge in Virginia 
the power to authorize the NIT warrant, even though the IP address would be transmitted from 
states outside the magistrate’s jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 777 
(“[B]ecause the NIT is analogous to a tracking device in both function and effect, the 
magistrate judge was authorized under Rule 41(b)(4) to issue a warrant for its use.”); see also 
United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 937–38 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (holding that because 
NIT “was an electronic tool or technique designed and executed for the purpose of tracking 
the movement of information” warrant was authorized under Rule 41(b)(4)); United States v. 
Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 
2016) (“The fact that courts are presently divided over whether the NIT Warrant even violated 
Rule 41 is compelling evidence that the FBI did not intentionally and deliberately violate that 
Rule by seeking the warrant in the first instance.”); United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 
520, 536 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding that because “[u]sers of Playpen digitally touched down in 
the Eastern District of Virginia when they logged into the site” NIT acted as a tracking device 
and is authorized under Rule 41(b)(4)); United States v. Eure, No. 2:16cr43, 2016 WL 
4059663, at *9 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016) (“Even if the FBI agents had some indication that the 
warrant might exceed the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge, there were credible arguments 
that the current rule allowed this warrant.”).  But see United States v. Weredene, 188 F. Supp. 
3d 431, 447 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (concluding that NIT software was “attached” in defendant’s 
state which was outside of magistrate’s jurisdiction, but that error was too minor to require 
suppression). 
118.  See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d. at 782–83 (concluding that defendant had no 
reasonable expectation in IP address so warrant was unnecessary, but also concluding that the 
warrant was valid even if required). 
119.  See id. at 774 (“The initial question presented here is whether Lough had the kind 
15
Dieter: You've Got Mail: FBI Hacking in United States v Lough and Why It
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
116 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 63: p. 101 
solely applied the Katz reasonable expectation test.120  As mentioned above, the 
Katz test requires that the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy and 
that the subjective expectation be one that society is prepared to accept.121  
Specifically, the court stated that, for the defendant’s suppression motion to be 
granted, he must have demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
IP address sent to the FBI by the NIT.122 
 Under the first subjective prong of the Katz test, the court determined that 
the defendant could not have had a subjective expectation of privacy due to the 
third party doctrine.123  The court noted that while the defendant wished to 
remain anonymous using the Tor network, hoping to remain anonymous is not 
equal to expecting it.124  Because the IP address had been communicated to 
numerous computers in the Tor chain, Lough could not have had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the IP address.125 
After the defendant did not satisfy the first prong of the Katz test, the 
analysis could have concluded.126  However, the court went on to explain that 
even if Lough had demonstrated a legitimate subjective expectation, he would 
not have passed the objective prong of the Katz test.127  The court noted that 
every federal court that has discussed the issue of privacy in IP addresses has 
 
of reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address that society is prepared to recognize.”).  
The court also discussed whether the specific warrant authorizing the NIT was sufficient to 
conduct a search.  See id. at 774–75.  In its opinion, the court also noted that “the vast 
majority of courts addressing [this] issue have found suppression unwarranted.”  See id. at 
774. 
120.  See id. at 775 (stating the requirement for a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable 
expectation of privacy).  Although the Lough court does not cite directly to Katz, it is clear 
that they were applying the test.  See id. (explaining the need for both a subjective and 
objective expectation of privacy). 
121.  See id. (explaining that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in an IP address and refraining from analyzing whether society would recognize this 
expectation of privacy).  The court also defined “objectively reasonable” to mean one “‘that 
society is willing to recognize as reasonable.’”  See id. (citing United States v. Castellanos, 
716 F.3d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 2013)); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, 
J., concurring) (enunciating two prongs of the reasonable expectation test).  For a further 
discussion of Katz, see supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text. 
122.  See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 775 (“Absent a legitimate expectation of privacy, 
Lough cannot invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment.”).  The court concluded that 
Lough cannot meet this expectation test for his IP address.  See id. 
123.  See id. (“Lough could not have had a subjective expectation of privacy because he 
voluntarily turned over his IP address to every computer with which he made contact, 
including the first node of the TOR network.”). 
124.  See id. (stating explicitly that, although the defendant “hoped that the TOR would 
facilitate” anonymity, “hoping and wishing are not the equivalent of expecting a certain 
result”).  The court stated, “At the very least, Lough certainly knew that he was revealing his 
IP address to one unknown third party who, for all he knew, was a law enforcement officer.”  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
125.  See id. (holding that because Lough had revealed “his affairs to another he t[ook] 
the risk that” the “information will be conveyed by that person to the Government”) (quoting 
United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016)). 
126.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361–62 (explaining that subjective expectation must be 
established first and if one does not exist then the analysis ends there). 
127.  See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 775 (“Even assuming that Lough did have a 
subjective expectation of privacy, it is not one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.” (citation omitted)). 
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concluded there is no objective expectation of privacy in them.128 
The Lough court recognized that individuals certainly have a privacy 
interest in items inside their homes, such as their computer and its contents.129  
However, the court distinguished Lough’s privacy interest in his computer and 
its contents from his lack of a privacy interest in his computer’s IP address.130  
Thus, the court determined that because the computer’s contents were not 
searched by the NIT, there was no Fourth Amendment search with respect to 
the defendant’s computer.131  Having concluded that neither the IP address nor 
other information gathered by the NIT constituted a search, the court denied 
Lough’s motion to suppress the evidence stemming from the NIT.132 
By determining that there was no Fourth Amendment search, the court 
ruled that no warrant was necessary to utilize the NIT.133  Nevertheless, the 
court examined the validity of the warrant authorizing the NIT.134  The court 
determined that because the NIT was, for all intents and purposes, a tracking 
device, the issuing magistrate had authority to supply the FBI with the warrant 
used to implement the NIT.135  In coming to its conclusion, the court analogized 
the way users visited the Playpen website to physically traveling to the location 
of the FBI-run server, where agents then virtually attached the tracking 
 
128.  See id. at 775–76 (citing United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 
2010)).   
Even if the defendant could show that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in 
his subscriber information, such an expectation would not be objectively 
reasonable.  Indeed, “every federal court to address this issue has held that 
subscriber information provided to an internet provider is not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation.” 
Bynum, 604 F.3d at 164 (quoting United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 
2008)). 
129.  See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 776 (“Clearly, Lough does have a privacy interest 
in his home and its contents, including his computer.”). 
130.  See id. (distinguishing between the search of the contents of the defendant’s 
computer and the FBI’s use of the NIT to identify the IP address of defendant’s computer and 
concluding that the former gave rise to a privacy interest while latter did not).  
131.  See id. (citing United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 433 (4th Cir. 2016)) 
(noting clear distinction made between content-based communications and non-content 
information and concluding that the NIT did not conduct search of contents of defendant’s 
computer). 
132.  See id. at 783 (“Lough had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address, 
nor did the NIT constitute a Fourth Amendment search of the content of his computer; thus, a 
warrant was unnecessary; . . . Accordingly, the Court denies Lough’s motion to suppress.”). 
133.  See id. (determining that warrant was unnecessary where defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in IP address and where there was no search of defendant’s 
computer). 
134.  See id. at 776–78 (analyzing validity of warrant and explaining the defendant’s 
contention was that the warrant exceeded the scope of the issuing magistrate’s authority, but 
concluding that the nature of NIT allowed the magistrate to have authorized its use). 
135.  See id. at 777 (“Nevertheless, because the NIT is analogous to a tracking device in 
both function and effect, the magistrate judge was authorized under Rule 41(b)(4) to issue a 
warrant for its use.”).  The court also noted that the companion case of Jean “tallied the courts 
that have specifically addressed whether the NIT was akin to a tracking device.”  See id.  
Many of the tallied courts have used the analogy of a “virtual trip” to determine the NIT is the 
functional equivalent of a tracking device.  See id.  
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device—the NIT—to a user’s “vehicle.”136  Thus, the NIT was a tracking device 
authorized by a legal warrant.137 
V. ERROR, INCOMPLETE DISC: COMPLETING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
SEARCH ANALYSIS 
While many courts have come to similar conclusions regarding the NIT—
and these conclusions may not necessarily be incorrect—the Lough court did 
not complete the Fourth Amendment search analysis prescribed in Jones.138  
The full determination of a search should have included both the Katz 
reasonableness test and the Jones physical intrusion test.139  Had the Lough 
court completed this analysis, it very well may have come to the conclusion that 
the NIT was in fact a search protected by the Fourth Amendment.140  
Additionally, companion cases suggest that the issue of whether there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in IP addresses could have been decided in 
favor of the defendant in Lough.141  If examined under both the Katz and Jones 
 
136.  See id. at 778 (agreeing with and following other courts’ “virtual trip” analogy).  
The court stated: 
Lough took a virtual trip to the Eastern District of Virginia, but rather than travel by 
car, he traveled digitally—his vehicle was comprised of packets of information.  
Once there, the FBI attached a digital electronic tracking device to those packets, 
which Lough virtually rode back to the Northern District of West Virginia.  Upon 
his virtual return, Lough parked his digital vehicle built of those packets of 
information on his computer, rather than in his driveway.  At that point, the NIT 
sent back his digital address, just as a GPS tracker would send back his coordinates. 
Id. 
137.  See id. (“Accordingly, the NIT is analogous to a tracking device . . . and the NIT 
warrant is an information-tracking warrant that comports with [the law], which [the 
magistrate] had the authority to issue.”). 
138.  See id. at 775 (holding that because Lough had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information taken by the malware, NIT was not a search); United States v. Jean, 
207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 933 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (“[T]he FBI in the instant case was under no legal 
obligation to obtain a search warrant . . . as IP addresses are unlikely to be entitled to the same 
Fourth Amendment protections as are the substantive contents of users’ computers.”); United 
States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 8, 2016) (proclaiming that NIT was not a search); United States v. Eure, No. 2:16cr43, 
2016 WL 4059663, at *9 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016) (holding that “searches and seizures 
perform[ed] pursuant to the NIT did not violate Fourth Amendment”); United States v. 
Weredene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 444 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (holding that Weredene’s computer was 
not searched because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address).  
139.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (explaining that the Katz test 
does not supersede the “physical intrusion” test, rather it supplemented it).  The Court stated, 
“Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”  Id. 
140.  See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding 
that NIT is search because “government literally . . . invaded the contents of the computer”); 
see also United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, at *3 (W.D. Tex. 
Sept. 9, 2016) (holding NIT was “unquestionably a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes” 
because it “placed code on [the] computer without [the defendant’s] permission”).  Although 
these two Lough companion cases do not explicitly analyze the situation under the Jones test, 
both seem to use the idea of a physical intrusion to label the NIT a search.  See Torres, 2016 
WL 4821223, at *3; Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 530. 
141.  See, e.g., United States v. Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d 732, 739 (W.D. Ky. 2016) 
(holding that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and that the third party doctrine does 
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tests, the NIT should be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.142 
A. The NIT Is a Search Under the Katz Test 
While the majority of courts have determined that IP addresses are subject 
to the third party doctrine, there is evidence that the third party doctrine may not 
apply to the specific facts of Lough.143  Indeed, at least one court challenges this 
idea by distinguishing between the government’s retrieval of information 
directly from the defendant using surveillance or an invasive technique and the 
government’s retrieval of the information from some business or other third 
party.144  For example, when the government obtains records from a business 
via subpoena, there is an inherent decrease, or even elimination, of the privacy 
interest.145  Thus, if under Katz the defendant’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy depends on how the government retrieved the information at issue, then 
it follows that information retrieved from a third party loses the expectation of 
privacy, whereas information retrieved using an invasive technique does not.146 
The Lough court concluded that the FBI’s use of the NIT fell within the 
third party doctrine of the Fourth Amendment because the defendant had 
provided his IP address to both his ISP and to other nodes on the Tor 
network.147  However, the NIT pulled the IP address and related information 
directly from the suspect’s computer.148  The FBI did not gain access to this 
 
not apply here because the FBI did not obtain IP address from third party but from computer 
itself). 
142.  See id. (applying Katz and finding NIT to be Fourth Amendment search); see also 
Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 528, 530 (finding a Fourth Amendment search due to apparent 
government intrusion in the context of a Jones discussion). 
143.  Cf. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Whether a 
defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in certain information depends in part on 
what the government did to get it.”).  In Carpenter, the court noted a distinction between 
police accidentally overhearing a phone conversation in a public place (not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment) and using a wiretap to hear that same conversation (protected by the 
Fourth Amendment).  See id.  
144.  See id. at 889 (highlighting two ends of the Fourth Amendment spectrum and 
noting that information collected from third parties is on one end and is unprotected by the 
Fourth Amendment, while information retrieved by government from suspect via some 
surveillance or other invasive technique is on the other end). 
145.  See id. (“[B]usiness records obtained from a third party . . . can only diminish the 
defendants’ privacy in the information those records contain.” (citations omitted)).   
146.  See id. at 888–89 (distinguishing Jones from Carpenter and concluding that, 
while there was reasonable expectation of privacy in Jones, there was no such expectation in 
Carpenter).  The court stated, “[T]he government action in this case is very different from the 
government action in Jones.  That distinction matters: in applying Katz, ‘it is important to 
begin by specifying precisely the nature of the state activity that is challenged.’”  Id. at 888 
(emphasis in original).  
147.  See United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 775 (N.D. W. Va. 2016) 
(explaining that the third party doctrine applies to those who expose their information to 
others and assume risk that this information may be turned over to government and finding it 
applied here because Lough gave his IP address to every computer with which he made 
contact). 
148.  See United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 926 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (describing 
that NIT deployed secretly on “activating computer” and sent information directly to FBI). 
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information by subpoenaing the ISP or the other Tor users.149  Indeed, the point 
of using the NIT was to obtain the IP addresses without going to some source 
other than the suspects themselves; moreover, the FBI could not have retrieved 
the IP addresses from any third party because the third party would not have 
been able to undo the camouflage created by Tor.150 
Even one of Lough’s companion cases, decided a few months earlier, 
concluded that defendants subjected to the NIT had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their IP addresses and computers.151  While conceding that 
individuals generally have no expectation of privacy in their IP addresses, the 
companion court noted that the FBI obtained the IP address from the 
defendant’s personal computer rather than from an ISP.152  The real question, 
according to the companion court, was whether defendants have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their private computers.153  Generally, courts have 
concluded that they clearly do.154  Through this lens, the companion court 
concluded that implementing the NIT and forcing code upon the defendant’s 
computer violated a reasonable expectation of privacy; thus, under the Katz test 
alone, the NIT was a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.155 
Even if the companion court’s conclusion was incorrect, at least one 
Supreme Court Justice has recently called for an evolution of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence to correspond with the new digital age.156  In her 
concurrence in Jones, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that America’s search 
and seizure jurisprudence is outdated and that people’s expectations of privacy 
 
149.  See id. (explaining that “[t]he users’ identifying information was purposely 
unknown to Playpen’s owner, and the users’ IP addresses remained concealed because the 
website was only accessible as a hidden service on the TOR network,” thus, the FBI could not 
have gone to an ISP to get the IP addresses as they had no way of knowing who they were 
targeting).   
150.  See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 772–73 (stating the FBI created the NIT for the 
purpose of obtaining information about those persons accessing the website). 
151.  See United States v. Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d 732, 739 (W.D. Ky. 2016) (“There 
appears to be no dispute that Ammons enjoyed a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
contents of his personal computer.  His expectation was reasonable too.” (citation omitted)). 
152.  See id. (noting that warrant listed the defendant’s computer as things to be 
searched).  The Ammons court appears to change the analysis from examining the IP address 
to examining the expectation defendants have in their computers.  See id.  By reframing the 
issue, the court easily determined that the third party doctrine did not apply because the 
defendant did not share his computer with a service provider—he only shared his IP address—
and the NIT searched his computer.  See id.  
153.  See id. (“The Government elides the fact that the NIT warrant describes Ammons’ 
computer as the thing to be searched . . . . Accordingly, the pertinent inquiry is whether 
Ammons had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his personal computer—
not merely in his IP address.” (citations omitted)).  
154.  See id. (“Generally speaking, computer users have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in data stored on a home computer.” (citing Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 
2001))). 
155.  See id. (concluding that the NIT was a search under the Katz test because it 
intruded on the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy); see also United States v. 
Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 529–30 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding that placing code on a 
defendant’s computer constituted search). 
156.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”). 
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have likely changed over time.157  Justice Sotomayor advocated for decoupling 
secrecy and privacy when it comes to the Fourth Amendment.158  Just because 
something is publicly available does not mean society would be willing to 
accept that there is no privacy interest in it.159  Unfortunately for the defendants 
whose IP addresses are obtained via NIT , such an evolution of the law has not 
occurred to date, and the Lough court’s interpretation of Katz appears to be the 
prevailing view.160 
B. The NIT Is a Search Under the Jones Test 
Even while giving deference to the Lough court’s conclusion with regard to 
the Katz test, it is still possible to conclude that the NIT was search.161  
Although none of Lough’s companion cases explicitly cite to Jones, their 
reasoning indicates that the idea of a physical intrusion played a role in their 
decisions.162  Despite the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones 
incorporated the physical intrusion test into any Fourth Amendment search 
analysis, the Lough court relied solely on the Katz test.163 
The Lough court should have inquired whether the NIT constituted a 
physical intrusion of the defendant’s computer.164  Interestingly, the court 
 
157.   See id. at 417–18 (noting “people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks” and “doubt[ing] that 
people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list 
of every web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.”). 
158.  See id. at 418 (“[W]hatever the societal expectations, they can attain 
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat 
secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.”). 
159.  See id. (“I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some 
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection.” (citation omitted)). 
160.  See United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 774-76 (N.D. W. Va. 2016) 
(noting that the opinion is guided by “the vast majority of courts” that have addressed similar 
issues and found suppression of NIT evidence unwarranted). 
161.  See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 (E.D. Va. 2016) (noting that 
the placement of code on the defendant’s computer constitutes a government intrusion and 
thus, a Fourth Amendment search).  The Darby court also noted that it is irrelevant that some 
of the information seized lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy.  See id. 
162.  See id. (“In placing code on Defendant’s computer, the government literally . . . 
invaded the contents of the computer.  Additionally, the code . . . caused Defendant’s 
computer to transmit certain information without the authority or knowledge of Defendant.”); 
see also United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, at *3 (W.D. Tex. 
Sept. 9, 2016) (“[T]he NIT placed code on [the] computer without [defendant’s] 
permission . . . [thus, the NIT] was unquestionably a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.”). 
163.  See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 775–76 (analyzing a Fourth Amendment search using 
only a reasonable expectation of privacy test and without any discussion of whether the NIT 
was a physical intrusion); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 407 (majority opinion) (“Katz did not 
erode the principle ‘that, when the Government does engage in physical intrusion of a 
constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 
(1983) (Brennan, J., concurring))). 
164.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (holding that physical intrusions are considered 
searches for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment).  In Jones, the installation and use of 
GPS was deemed a search because “[t]he Government physically occupied private property 
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displayed this type of reasoning when it described the NIT as a tracking device 
and used the “virtual trip” analogy.165  In analogizing the installation and use of 
the NIT to that of a GPS tracker, the court should have realized the factual 
similarities to Jones, as well as Knotts and Karo.166  In these cases, as well as in 
Lough, the government affixed a device for the purpose of obtaining 
information.167  While this action did not constitute a search in Knotts and Karo, 
it did in Jones.168 
Importantly, the facts of Lough are more similar to Jones than to Knotts 
and Karo.169  In Lough, the NIT was virtually placed on the defendant’s 
computer without his knowledge or consent, and the computer was inside of his 
home when this occurred.170  Unlike the facts in Knotts and Karo, Lough’s 
computer was in his possession when the government affixed its “tracking 
device” to it.171  Companion cases of Lough indicated that the FBI’s placement 
of malware onto a computer without the owner’s permission equates to a 
physical intrusion, even if they do not explicitly state that conclusion.172 
 
for the purpose of obtaining information.”  See id.   
165.  See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 778 (comparing the NIT to a GPS tracker).  The 
court in Lough likened the defendant’s visit to Playpen to him taking a trip via car.  See id.  
Much like in Jones, where the FBI attached a GPS to a defendant’s Jeep, in Lough the FBI 
attached the NIT to the defendant’s virtual vehicle.  See id.; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 403.  
The Lough court analogized the transmission of the IP address to the transmission of location 
data from a GPS. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 778.  Thus, the court concluded, the NIT was 
akin to a GPS tracker.  See id.  
166.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 403 (stating that police affixed a GPS tracker to the 
defendant’s vehicle and that this practice constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment); 
see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984) (explaining that in order to track 
movements of suspected drug manufacturer, police obtained permission from the chemical 
distributor to swap a drum of ether with a drum bugged with a beeper); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 
278–79 (1983) (explaining that law enforcement officials placed a radio transmitter inside of a 
chemical drum, while in possession of the chemical distributor, in order to track the 
movements of suspected drug manufacturers). 
167.  See Karo, 468 U.S. at 712 (describing the installation of a beeper inside the can of 
ether); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278 (describing installation of beeper inside five-gallon container 
of chloroform). 
168.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 409–10 (differentiating itself from Knotts and Karo due to 
the fact that in the beeper cases, potential intrusions occurred before property was held by 
defendants, while in Jones the vehicle the government bugged was owned and in possession 
of the defendant); see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 712 (holding that beeper’s placement did not 
infringe a privacy interest); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (holding that the act of installing a beeper 
into a vat of chemicals is not in itself a search). 
169.  See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (describing the process used by the NIT to 
transfer the data); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 409–10 (differentiating itself from Knotts and 
Karo because the government bugged item that was owned and in possession of the 
defendant). 
170.  See id. at 773, 778 (explaining that the NIT was transmitted from FBI 
headquarters directly onto defendant’s computer and that under the court’s “virtual trip” 
analogy neither defendant nor his computer actually left his home in West Virginia). 
171.  See id. at 778 (stating defendant’s computer never left his house, thus creating 
“virtual trip” analogy); see Karo, 468 U.S. at 708 (explaining that the beeper was placed into a 
container belonging to law enforcement who then swapped it with one set to be purchased by 
defendant); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278 (stating that the beeper was installed while the container 
was in possession of the chemical company).   
172.  See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 (E.D. Va. 2016) (noting that 
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Perhaps the reason courts have been reluctant to apply the physical 
intrusion test to the NIT is the fact that the intrusion occurred digitally.173  Yet, 
in Jones, Justice Scalia noted that the intrusion test has always been tied to the 
law of trespass.174  Although the Supreme Court may be slow to react when it 
comes to technology, numerous courts have expanded trespass into the cyber 
realm.175 
Electronic signals appear to be enough to establish a cybertrespass, and the 
threshold requirement of damage or occupation is minimal.176  The concept of 
Cybertrespass suggests that the FBI physically intrudes into a defendant’s 
computer by sending an unwanted signal occupying a small portion of a 
defendant’s hard drive space.177  As it applies to Lough, by combining the 
notions that a cybertrespass requires a very small amount of storage to be 
occupied and that a physical intrusion can be as minimal as an officer reaching 
into a vehicle, it can be argued that the implementation of the NIT without the 
computer owner’s permission would constitute a Fourth Amendment search.178 
 
the government literally intruded into defendant’s computer by placing code there without 
permission); see also United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, at 
*3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016) (holding that by installing the NIT without permission, the 
government “unquestionably” committed Fourth Amendment search and seizure). 
173.  Cf. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (explaining that information secured by the NIT 
was transferred to FBI via internet). 
174.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (acknowledging a close 
connection between property law and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).  Justice Scalia 
wrote, 
The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to property, since 
otherwise it would have referred simply to “the right of the people to be secure 
against unreasonable searches and seizures”; the phrase “in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects” would have been superfluous.  Consistent with this 
understanding, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law 
trespass . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted)  
175.  See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 
2000) (holding that electronic signals are enough to establish trespass action); America 
Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550–51 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that even without 
physical damage to computer, unwanted spam still trespass); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber 
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding these is a viable claim 
for trespass when the defendant sends unwanted electronic signals to the plaintiff’s network); 
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566 (1996) (holding that it is a trespass 
to “hack” into computer system to make free long distance telephone calls); Washington v. 
Riley, 846 P.2d 1365 (Wash. 1993) (“[A] person is guilty of computer trespass in the first 
degree if the person, without authorization, intentionally gains access to a computer system or 
electronic data base of another[.]” (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.110 (repealed 2016))). 
176.  See eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (holding that even a very small percentage 
of unauthorized usage constitutes trespass because it is still use of another person’s property).  
But see Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 309, 312 (Cal. 2003) (holding that some level of 
actual damage to a computer system is necessary to establish cause of action for trespass). 
177.  Cf. United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 928 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (noting that 
the NIT downloaded and did its job so quickly that it would have been unnoticeable by the 
owner of computer); see also Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 79-82 
(2003) (explaining the idea of trespass in the digital realm). 
178.  See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 111 (1986) (stating that even very small 
physical intrusions can constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment); Lough, 221 F. 
Supp. 3d at 773 (describing how the FBI deployed NIT on Lough’s computer without his 
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VI. LOGGING OFF: IMPACT AND MORE QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER 
The digital age has revolutionized the way the world does business, learns, 
communicates, and thinks; this technological boom has been less effective in 
forcing a legal evolution.179  Indeed, as Justice Sotomayor stressed in her 
concurring opinion in Jones, it is critical that courts be willing to adapt their 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment to new technologies or they risk 
becoming antiquated.180  Specifically, the analysis under Katz likely requires 
reconsideration of what society truly expects in terms of online privacy.181  This 
area of law is a new frontier, and the decisions made by courts like Lough will 
determine the way lawyers and government agents interact with the 
Constitution, thus changing the way the world operates.182 
It is important to note that, although Lough failed to consider the Jones 
Fourth Amendment test, it does not necessarily mean the NIT violated the 
Constitution.183  Indeed, Lough and the majority of its companions found that 
the warrant used to authorize the NIT was sufficient.184  Thus, although the NIT 
was a search, it was a warranted one.185 
Yet, the prospect of these types of “mass warrants” is still frightening to 
those concerned with protecting individual liberties.186  One fear is that law 
enforcement tools like the NIT are a slippery slope; if the FBI can forcibly place 
code on a person’s computer, what else can it do?187  The FBI has attempted to 
 
knowledge); eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (setting the amount of resource use necessary 
for cybertrespass is very low). 
179.  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (holding just three years ago 
that cellphones were categorically different than other types of information containers, such as 
cigarette packets); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing 
that the Supreme Court may need to update its thinking with regard to Fourth Amendment 
search analysis in order to keep pace with the evolution of technology and its interaction with 
society). 
180.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 418 (expressing “doubt that people would accept without 
complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every web site they had 
visited”). 
181.  See id. at 418 (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.  
This approach is ill suited for the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.” 
(citations omitted)). 
182.  See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text (explaining that the United States 
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the physical world is well defined, but 
digital world jurisprudence in nearly non-existent). 
183.  See Lough, 221 F. Supp. at 778 (finding that the warrant authorizing NIT was 
sufficient); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing protections against warrantless 
searches and seizures). 
184.  See United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 938 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (tallying 
numerous Lough companion cases finding the warrant to have been adequate to authorize 
NIT). 
185.  See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 778 (comparing the NIT to a GPS tracker and 
concluding that the NIT warrant complied with federal law). 
186.  See Nakashima, supra note 1 (“As the hacking techniques become more 
ambitious, failure in execution can lead to large-scale privacy and civil liberties abuses at 
home and abroad.”). 
187.  See id. (expressing concern about NIT’s future impact). 
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quell these concerns by stating the NIT is only to be used against those taking 
actions to download child pornography; therefore, it would be highly unlikely 
for a truly innocent person to come into contact with the NIT.188  Nevertheless, 
in a post-Snowden world, it is all too common for the public to harbor distrust 
of covert government actions.189 
 
 
188.  See id. (“[T]he bureau recognizes that the use of an NIT is ‘intrusive’ and should 
only be deployed ‘in the most serious cases.’  [The quoted FBI agent] said the FBI uses the 
tool only against offenders who are ‘the worst of the worst.’”). 
189.  See NPR Staff, supra note 42 (explaining that Tor usage increased after 
Snowden’s revelation of NSA techniques). 
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